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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The cost of operating and maintaining weapon systems is a large expense to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and suitability performance is a major factor affecting these 
costs. Systems with poor suitability performance (such as low reliability, high failure rates, high 
spare parts usage, and low availability) are extremely difficult to support in a constrained 
resource environment. For many DoD acquisition programs, suitability lags effectiveness during 
program development. Suitability determinants (such as reliability and maintainability) are 
generally not addressed early enough during program development (prior to fielding) and are 
not prioritized with the same vigor and discipline as performance parameters like speed, 
accuracy, and lethality. The JROC, DOT&E, and USD(AT&L) have each called for increased 
attention to suitability improvement. 
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this article was to investigate the suitability performance 
challenges of the recently deployed Stryker system, which was accelerated into combat in 2003. 
Suitability drivers were identified and possible causal factors were investigated. Several specific 
suitability issues for the Stryker system were revealed during this study. Stryker is performing 
well in the field with an Operational Readiness Rate (ORR) consistently above the required 
contractual value. However, a harsh combat scenario, dynamic threat environment, and 








During his first annual report to Congress, the newly confirmed Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Dr. Charles E. McQueary made three initial observations. His first 
observation was that Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) is too often the place where 
performance deficiencies are discovered.  Finding performance problems early in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process is important—either in government 
Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) or contractor testing. Detecting and correcting design 
issues early in the development process will mitigate program cost overruns and schedule 
delays. McQueary’s second observation was that the DoD acquisition system is inherently slow 
and must improve to accommodate rapid fielding of new weapons systems and new 
technologies. The need for rapid fielding of new technology is evident in the extended hostilities 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., armor upgrades for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV) and the new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle). His third 
observation was that operational suitability of DoD systems is too low and needs to improve. 
The definition of operational suitability, which can be found in the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, Chapter 9 (Operational Test and Evaluation), Section 9.4.5 (Evaluation of 
Operational Suitability), is as follows:  
Operational Suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in 
field use, with consideration given to reliability, availability, compatibility, transportability, 
interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human factors, manpower 
supportability, logistics supportability, documentation, training requirements, and natural 
environmental effects and impacts. (Duma & Krieg, 2005) 
The Cost of Low Suitability 
Low suitability is a direct contributor to higher lifecycle support costs. Data for the 
previous three years (2004–2006) showed that 35% of Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
(IOT&E) phases resulted in unfavorable suitability evaluations as reported to Congress in each 
system’s Beyond Low Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) Report (Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation, 2007).  
While the technical performance of weapon systems (such as speed, accuracy, and 
firepower) has improved significantly over the last several decades, suitability parameters (such 
as reliability, availability, and maintainability) have not improved. Figures 1, 2, and 3 indicate 
that this problem has been a trend for more than 20 years. All data in Figures 1–3 are based on 
Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) programs evaluated during the years shown. 
Figure 1 (Duma & Krieg, 2005) shows that from 1985 through 1990, only 41% of programs 
evaluated by ATEC successfully demonstrated reliability requirements during operational 
testing. Figure 2 (Duma & Krieg, 2005) shows that between 1996 and 2000, only 20% of 
programs met reliability requirements; and Figure 3 (US Army Test and Evaluation Command, 








Figure 1. Reliability During Operational Tests (1985–1990) 
(Duma & Krieg, 2005) 
 
Figure 2. Reliability During Operational Tests (1996–2000) 
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Figure 3. Reliability During Operational Tests (1996–2005) 
(US Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2007) 
Stryker was a new Army program in 2000, but suitability issues were certainly not a new 
problem. The Defense Science Board (DSB) pointed out in 2000 that 80% of US Army defense 
systems fail to achieve even half of their required reliability parameters (National Research 
Council, 2006). Steps have been taken to help address this concern. In November 2004, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), directed 
that acquisition programs measure performance in terms of operational availability, mission 
reliability, and cost per unit of usage (USD(AT&L), 2004). Three months later, the USD(AT&L) 
issued a memorandum on Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) Metrics, which 
provided specific definitions, formulas, and metrics for calculating important suitability 
parameters, such as operational availability and mission reliability. In 2005, the DSB 
recommended that the DoD aggressively pursue implementation of performance-based logistics 
for all weapon systems. The USD(AT&L) has also directed that the TLCSM Executive Council 
develop a metrics handbook to be used in performance-based contracts and sustainment 
oversight (USD(AT&L), 2004; 2006). In August 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) mandated a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) of materiel availability including key 
system attributes of materiel reliability and ownership costs (Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, 2006). These initiatives were designed to improve operational performance, establish 
standard suitability metrics, and reduce lifecycle support costs of new DoD weapon systems. 
McQueary’s third observation in his FY 2006 Annual Report is the basis for this research 
article. Many times, systems receiving favorable effectiveness evaluations but unfavorable 
suitability evaluations from IOT&E are fielded before suitability shortcomings are corrected. 
Even though there may be good reasons for deploying these systems before correcting all 
suitability issues (such as an urgent combat need or the negative consequences of stopping a 
hot production line), fielding systems before suitability deficiencies are corrected will result in 
reduced operational availability and increased support costs. Low suitability directly results in 
 Amongst Systems Which Did Not Meet Reliability Requirements in OT, 
75% of Them Failed to Achieve Half of Their Requirement 
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increased lifecycle support costs. These costs can appear in many forms, such as increased 
spares, increased contractor support, increased maintenance actions, increased maintenance 
man-hours, decreased reliability, decreased availability, and decreased combat capability. 
Costs over and above the planned costs of lifecycle support can represent a large and 
unbudgeted expense for the DoD. This undesirable trend of low suitability during major weapon 
system development has been observed for at least 20 years across all services, and this trend 
is not improving. For example, the reliability success rate of Army systems tested in 1996–2005 
(34%) is lower than the reliability success rate for 1985-1990 (41%).  
Overview 
The Stryker family of vehicles was conceived as part of the Army’s Transformation 
Campaign Plan. In 1999, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, came to the conclusion 
that the Army had serious deployability and mobility issues (Military.com, 2007). Though the 
Army was capable of full-spectrum dominance, its organization and force structure were not 
optimized for strategic responsiveness. Army light forces could deploy rapidly, but they lacked 
the lethality, mobility, and staying power necessary to be effective in peacekeeping scenarios. 
On the other hand, Army mechanized forces possessed the necessary lethality and staying 
power but required a large logistics footprint, which hindered their ability to be quickly deployed. 
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army announced a new Army vision in October 1999 
to build a landpower force capable of strategic dominance across the full spectrum of ground 
combat operations. The key to implementing this vision was that the Army become more 
strategically responsive. Stryker was designed as a full-spectrum, early-entry combat force and 
optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingencies. It was developed to operate in 
a complex environment, including urban terrain, while confronting low- to mid-range threats with 
conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Requirements for the Stryker include rapid 
deployment, early entry execution, and the ability to conduct effective combat operations 
immediately upon arrival (Training and Doctrine Command, 2000, June 30).     
Schedule-driven Compromises 
Stryker was initially deployed to Iraq in 2003 due to an urgent combat requirement. Prior 
to deployment, Stryker underwent an aggressive and accelerated development and test 
program. The urgency of the war prevented the complete spectrum of operational testing to be 
completed within allowable time constraints. During IOT&E, only a few selected missions, types 
of terrain, and levels of conflict intensity were evaluated. Also, vehicles used did not accrue 
sufficient operating time to yield statistically relevant Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) data.  
In addition, a major configuration change was not included as part of IOT&E or PVT (Production 
Verification Tests) because add-on armor was not available for installation when testing was 
performed. The add-on armor package increased vehicle weight by approximately 20%. Since 
these tests were done in under-stressed conditions (without add-on armor), long-term durability 
problems were unlikely to be detected (National Research Council, 2004). 
Schedule-driven compromises in T&E are not unusual to DoD programs.  
Pressures on program officials to meet budgets and deadlines, due to 
congressional and other oversight, result in test strategies geared toward 
demonstrating “successful” performance. Thus, testing is often carried out under 
benign or typical stresses and operating conditions, rather than striving to 
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determine failure modes and system limitations under more extreme circumstances. 
(National Research Council, 2006, p. 19) 
According to an article printed in the Detroit News (Zagaroli, 2005), the Project on 
Government Oversight, a nonprofit government accountability organization, reported that 
Stryker was rushed through development, and lack of complete testing could give operators a 
false sense of security if failure modes are not understood (2005). However, the same 
newspaper article acknowledged that reports from the field overwhelmingly indicated that 
Stryker was performing in an outstanding manner. One of the early decisions made by the Army 
to support an accelerated development and deployment timeline was to rely on contractor 
performance-based logistics (PBL) support within the Stryker brigades. Some of the duties of 
the contractor personnel included conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and managing 
the Stryker-specific supply chain. When Stryker was first deployed to Iraq, the Army did not 
have the institutional capability to train soldiers on conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance, and 
therefore faced an immediate need for contractor maintenance personnel to support the 
deployment (GAO, 2006, September 5).  
Each deployed Stryker brigade was fielded with 45 imbedded vehicle maintenance 
contractor personnel. The Army desires to eventually replace the 45 contractors with active duty 
soldiers. Current plans call for implementation (removal of embedded contractors) to begin in 
2008; however, the GAO reported that this goal will be difficult for the Army to achieve for 
several reasons. First, the 45 imbedded contractor maintenance personnel must be replaced by 
71 soldiers due to other collateral duties and common training requirements of soldiers. Second, 
the Army is very short of personnel with the five military occupational specialties for wheeled 
vehicle mechanics—resulting in a very difficult recruiting challenge for the Army. Currently, as 
reported by the Washington Post (White, 2007) and the New York Times (Cloud, 2007), the 
Army is falling short of current recruiting goals.  
Operational Readiness 
A key factor affecting Stryker suitability performance is deployed operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO). The program office estimates that the operational tempo is 6 times greater than 
the originally planned OPTEMPO. Other interviews yielded estimates of operational tempo up to 
10 times the planned OPTEMPO. Harry Levins (2007) reports that vehicles in Iraq are using up 
7 years of service life for each year of service in Iraq. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2006, September 5) estimates that service life is being expended 800% faster than 
expected. This greatly increased operational tempo results in unexpected failure modes and 
increased failure rates. 
A general finding of this study was that the Army is satisfied with Stryker’s performance 
in the field. System performance in an asymmetric combat scenario under difficult 
environmental conditions exceeds Army expectations. Brigade commanders have consistently 
reported high operational readiness rates (greater than 90%) since Stryker was fielded, despite 
the fact that combat conditions in Iraq have been much different than expected (Figure 4). For 
example, from October 2003 to September 2005, the first two Stryker brigades that deployed to 
Iraq reported an average Operational Readiness Rate (ORR) of 96%, which was well above the 
















Figure 4. Operational Readiness Rates 
Due to the asymmetric nature of the threat forces and to the highly adaptive nature of 
the enemy, the combat scenarios and operating environment have been much different than 
expected. According to the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile (IAV OMS/MP) (Training and Doctrine Command, 2000), the Stryker 
planned mission profile called for operations on hard roads 20% of the time, and cross-country 
operations 80% of the time. The actual Stryker usage in Iraq has been almost the opposite (~ 
80% on hard roads, 20% cross-country). Most missions resemble police actions in an urban 
environment on paved roads, and crews must routinely drive over curbs and other small 
obstacles to navigate the urban environment. This requires a higher tire pressure than normal, 
causing more vibration and shock loads and high structural stress on the vehicles.  
In response to the greater threat of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), and small projectiles, the Army configured Stryker with an add-on slat 
armor package and crews added sand bags. The additional weight affected the performance of 
the Stryker family of vehicles as follows: 
 To operate with the increased vehicle weight, the operating tire pressure had to be 
increased from the design specification of 80 psi to 95 psi. Stryker is configured with a 
centralized tire pressure system that is designed to automatically keep the tire pressure 
at the optimum value for specific terrain conditions, speed, and traction. The automatic 
inflation system was not designed to maintain 95 psi, so soldiers must set tire pressure 
manually and check it three times daily (Smith, 2005). The requirement to over-inflate 
the tires to 95 psi and to physically check tire pressure three times per day is an 
operational nuisance because these are unplanned, but necessary, preventive 
maintenance actions. Additionally, the combination of routine excessive structural stress 
and increased tire pressure causes unanticipated structural failures. For example, a 
ORR vs Strykers Fielded
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large number of wheel spindles developed fatigue cracks and had to be replaced early. 
Drive shafts are also failing sooner than expected.  
 Due to the issues of added weight, excessive tire pressure, and severe operating 
conditions, tires are also failing at a high rate. In one 96-hour test period at Fort Irwin, 
CA—with 16 Stryker vehicles—13 tires had to be changed (WorldNetDaily, 2003). The 
Washington Post reported that 11 tire and wheel assemblies fail every day, and the GAO 
asserts that each Stryker vehicle is going through one tire per day on average (Smith, 
2005). The additional maintenance actions (checking/adjusting tire pressures and 
changing tires) are extremely burdensome to the crews since changing tires is not crew-
level maintenance and requires special tools.  
 The 5,000 pounds of armor to counter RPG threats is generally effective but has many 
negative operational consequences, such as limited maneuverability, increased 
component stresses, safety issues, and transportability issues. The extra weight and 
increased physical dimensions caused by the add-on slat armor adversely impacts 
performance, especially when maneuvering in spaces with narrow clearance and 
maneuvering in wet conditions. Operations in soft sand or wet conditions (mud) place 
additional stress on engines, drive shafts, and differentials; these items have 
experienced higher-than-normal failure rates (Dougherty, 2004).  
 Also, the slat armor causes multiple problems for safe and effective operations. Slat 
armor can deform during normal operations, sometimes blocking escape hatches and 
the rear troop egress door. The armor adds approximately 3 feet to the vehicle’s width 
and can interfere with the driver’s vision. Armor also makes it difficult for others to see 
the Stryker at night, which is a safety hazard in the urban environment. The armor is 
very heavy for the rear ramp and strains lifting equipment; crews must sometimes 
manually assist raising or lowering the rear ramp. The armor attaching bolts on the rear 
ramp can break off with normal use (increasing the maintenance burden) and may 
generate unsafe conditions. In addition, slat armor prohibits normal use of storage racks, 
which may impact operations. Lastly, slat armor affects the transportability of the vehicle 
in a C-130 cargo aircraft, since the extra weight greatly reduces transport range (GAO, 
2004).  
Even though these operational issues caused by the add-on slat armor place additional 
maintenance burdens on crews, Stryker has been reported to be well-suited for the urban fight. 
Unlike the M-1 tank, Stryker can operate very quietly at high speed, which can be a tremendous 
tactical advantage (Tyson, 2003). Most Army personnel interviewed felt strongly that Stryker’s 
tactical performance in the urban environment in Iraq was significantly better than the M113A3, 
HMMWV, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, or Abrams Tank.  
In response to unanticipated urgent combat needs in Iraq, some engineering 
improvements (configuration changes) were performed on the Stryker since deployment. Since 
the Army did not buy the technical data package because of its cost, these engineering changes 
have resulted in increased costs and potential risks (GAO, 2006, July). The GAO reports that 
current DoD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term technical data rights for 
weapon system sustainment. As part of the department’s acquisition reforms and performance-
based strategies, the DoD has de-emphasized the acquisition of technical data rights. The GAO 
has recommended that the DoD recognize the need for the acquisition of technical data rights 
and asserts that without technical data rights, the DoD may face challenges in efficiently 
sustaining weapon systems throughout their lifecycle. 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 164 - 
=
=
A very important contractual requirement for the prime contractor, General Dynamics 
Land Systems (GDLS), is to maintain an Operational Readiness Rate (ORR) of 90% or better. 
This requirement pertains only to the base vehicle configuration and does not include 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Since initial deployment, Stryker has routinely 
exceeded this operational requirement. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract effectively 
motivates GDLS to exceed 90% ORR; however, the contract is not necessarily effective at 
controlling support costs, and this may be a risk to the government (US Army Audit Agency, 
2005). One example of such a risk is the repair and replacement of a high-failure item—for 
example, cracked hydraulic reservoirs in the power pack. Maintenance procedures call for the 
entire power pack to be replaced as a unit, rather than removing and repairing/replacing the 
hydraulic reservoir within the power pack. Replacing entire power packs (instead of 
repairing/replacing hydraulic reservoirs within the power packs) results in shorter down-times 
and higher ORR, but it also requires more power packs (very large, expensive units) to be 
purchased and shipped to operating bases and forward maintenance facilities. The net result is 
that higher operational readiness is being purchased with increased transportation and storage 
costs.  
Sustainability Challenges 
Since Stryker’s initial deployment was accelerated to meet an urgent combat need, the 
Stryker program team was performing the following activities concurrently: testing, production, 
fielding, training, and combat. In addition to the many challenges caused by these concurrent 
activities, the threat and operational environment in Iraq were different than anticipated, as 
previously mentioned. Several other factors added to the difficulty of maintaining Stryker 
vehicles in the field.  
First, the Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs) were not mature at the time 
of initial fielding. Many maintenance procedures could not be performed based on the IETMs 
because they were either not characterized correctly or crews were not adequately trained on 
their use. This situation led to tribal system maintenance, in which units depended on soldiers 
and contractors with experience on similar systems (like the M-113 armored personnel carrier) 
to figure out how to perform the maintenance actions correctly.  
Second, since a large portion of maintenance actions were supported by contractor 
personnel, soldiers developed a rental car mentality. This lack of ownership mentality resulted in 
soldiers being overly dependent on contractor personnel to perform routine preventive 
maintenance actions, such as checking fluid levels. One vehicle was lost because the pre-
mission engine oil check was ignored. 
Findings 
Stryker is performing well in the field. The system is exceeding expectations of Army 
management and soldiers. In spite of a changing threat environment (improved IEDs and 
excessive operations in the urban environment) and major configuration changes (5,000 pounds 
of add-on armor), Stryker is accomplishing its mission. The Operational Readiness Rate has 
consistently been over 90%. 
Due to the increased threat of RPGs and IEDs, Stryker was outfitted with an add-on 
armor package. The additional 5,000 pounds of armor has been generally effective at mitigating 
the threat but has resulted in some negative operational/support consequences. The extra 
weight requires increased tire pressure, which causes operational problems and more structural 
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stresses. Additionally, the armor limits crew visibility during operations and restricts airlift 
transportability on a C-130 aircraft. 
Army decisions regarding contractor logistics support may remain with the Stryker 
program for years. When Stryker was first deployed to Iraq in 2003, the Army faced an 
immediate need for contractor maintenance personnel to support operations (45 vehicle 
maintenance personnel per brigade). The Army plans to eventually replace the 45 contractor 
maintenance personnel with soldiers, but it will take approximately 71 soldiers per brigade to 
perform the same level of vehicle maintenance as the 45 contractors because of other duties 
and responsibilities of active duty personnel. The current plan is to begin the transition to soldier 
maintenance in 2008, but the transition will probably be very difficult to implement due to the 
poor recruiting/retention outlook in general and to the shortage of appropriate active duty 
maintenance personnel.  
Stryker program development was accelerated to meet the Army’s combat needs in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to the compressed developmental schedule, Stryker DT/OT was 
unable to fully test all configuration changes. DT revealed relevant problem areas, but there was 
insufficient time or priority to correct all problems before OT and fielding. 
For many DoD acquisition programs, the maturity of suitability parameters lags the 
maturity of effectiveness parameters during program development. Suitability determinants 
(such as reliability and maintainability) are not addressed early enough and are not prioritized 
with the same vigor and discipline as performance parameters like speed, accuracy, and 
lethality. 
The general issue of suitability shortfalls in DoD acquisition programs is recognized at 
high levels of management and is being addressed. JROC, DOT&E, and USD(AT&L) have each 
called for increased attention to suitability improvements. For example, a new requirement 
exists for a Materiel Availability KPP. 
The operational tempo of Stryker vehicles in Iraq far exceeds original usage estimates 
by at least 500%. Also, the mission profile of Stryker is much different than expected (80% on 
paved roads). This, in combination with the added weight of slat armor, has resulted in 
excessive stresses to the suspension, wheels, and tire assemblies, which causes increased 
failure rates of these items. 
Since Stryker was fielded in 2003 in Iraq, the operational situation has been dynamic, 
unpredictable, and volatile. Four factors have made it very difficult to obtain complete and 
reliable data for trend analyses. The first factor is the rapidly evolving adaptive nature of the 
threat in an asymmetric combat environment. The second factor is that the operational 
environment for deployed Stryker vehicles is more severe than anticipated during 
design/development. The third factor is that, in response to the first two factors, configuration 
changes have precluded a stable baseline. The fourth factor is that in a dangerous combat 
scenario, recording and reporting data is not a high priority for operational crews.  
Conclusions 
In response to Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was an urgent operational need to deploy 
the Stryker system. Therefore, the development and test programs were greatly accelerated to 
get Stryker units into the field as quickly as possible. At the same time, the mission was 
changing as the threat quickly adapted and evolved in this asymmetric combat environment. 
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The continually changing configuration baseline and changing tactical conditions made it very 
difficult to evaluate or predict reliability and suitability performance across all mission scenarios. 
The operational situation has been dynamic, as well as unpredictable and volatile, because 
Stryker was deployed in operational combat conditions that were different from, and much more 
complex than, those originally anticipated. In many ways, the system was not adequately 
designed for the actual threat it currently faces. However, this is certainly not the first time nor 
the last time this type of situation will occur. As a result, this case is a good example of how 
incomplete or incorrect maintenance/support planning can significantly add to the logistics 
burden. Due to the adaptive nature of the threat in the asymmetric warfare environment of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, our acquisition managers and operational planners are challenged to consider 
more complex and dynamic combat scenarios and contingencies than ever before. 
List of References 
Cloud, D. (2007, July 10). Army misses its June goal for new recruits. New York Times. Retrieved 
February 12, 2008, from 
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/washington/10military.html?ex=1341720000&en=9c451401c49310
6d&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). (2007, January). FY-2006 annual report. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Dougherty, J.E. (2004, March 3). Stryker: Army’s multimillion-dollar “lemon,” or “excellent” lemonade? 
Retrieved February 12, 2008, from 
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/3/3/155315.shtml 
Duma, W.D., & Krieg, K.J. (2005, June 20). DoD guide for achieving reliability, availability, and 
maintainability. Washington, DC: DoD. 
GAO. (2004, August). Military transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker vehicles is well under way, but 
expectations for their transportability by C-130 aircraft need to be clarified (GAO-04-925). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2006, July). Weapons acquisition: DoD should strengthen policies for assessing technical data 
needs to support weapon systems (GAO-06-839). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2006, September 5). Defense logistics: Changes to Stryker vehicle maintenance support should 
identify strategies for addressing implementation challenges (GAO-06-928R). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. (2006, August 17). Key performance parameter study 
recommendations and implementation (JROCM161-06). Washington, DC: Author. 
Levins, H. (2007, June 23). War exacts heavy toll on military vehicles, too. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. A2. 
Military.com. (2007, July 2). Hell on wheels: The Stryker combat vehicle. Retrieved February 12, 2008, 
from www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_Stryker,,00.html 
National Research Council. (2004). Improved operational testing and evaluation. Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press. 
National Research Council. (2006). Testing of defense systems in an evolutionary acquisition 
environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
Smith, R.J. (2005, March 31). Study faults Army vehicle. Washington Post, p. A04. 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). (2000). Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) operational mode 
summary/mission profile (OMS/MP). Fort Lewis, WA: Author. 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). (2000, June 30). Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) 
organizational and operational concept (Ver. 4). Fort Lewis, WA: Author.  
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 167 - 
=
=
Tyson, A.S. (2003, October 9). New Army “Stryker” combat vehicle nears Iraq test. The Christian Science 
Monitor. Retrieved February 12, 2008, from, www.csmonitor.com/2003/1009/p02s02-usmi.html 
US Army Audit Agency. (2005, December 6). Stryker contract logistics support costs (A-2006-0028-ALM). 
Alexandria, VA: Author. 
US Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). (2007, March 14). DoD/NDIA Suitability Conference. 
Hilton Head, SC: Author. 
USD(AT&L). (2004, August 16). Performance measurement metrics. Washington, DC: Author. 
USD(AT&L). (2006, November 23). Total life cycle systems management (TLCSM) metrics. Washington, 
DC: Author. 
White, J. (2007, July 10). Army’s recruiting goal lags for several months in a row. Washington Post. 
Retrieved February 12, 2008, from 
http://globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/overstretch/2007/0710recruitlag.htm 
WorldNetDaily. (2003, June 4). Billions wasted on new military vehicle? Retrieved February 12, 2008, 
from www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=32898 








2003 - 2008 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Managing Services Supply Chain 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 Spiral Development 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
Contract Management 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 Contractors in 21st Century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution 
Financial Management 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Capital Budgeting for DoD 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Acquisitions via leasing: MPS case 








 Learning Management Systems 
 Tuition Assistance 
 Retention 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
Logistics Management 
 R-TOC Aegis Microwave Power Tubes 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 Army LOG MOD 
 PBL (4) 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 RFID (4) 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to Aegis and SSDS 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 
website: www.acquisitionresearch.org    
 









www.acquisitionresearch.org   
